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The Program on Alternative Investments of the Center on Japanese Economy and Business analyzes three sets of alterna-
tive asset classes—private equity, hedge funds, and real estate—in Japan and elsewhere in East Asia in international 
perspective. The Program meets its substantive goals through a combination of research projects and seminar presenta-
tions, the latter led by leading practitioners in each of these three alternative asset classes. For information on the Center on
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Initially developed in the United States, the buyout industry is finally emerging in Japan. The ear-liest U.S. firms to enter the field began operations more than a quarter century ago, and some of
these firms pioneered techniques now standard in the industry. Yet virtually no buyout activity took
place in Japan until the late 1990s, and Japan’s distinctive economic and social arrangements clearly
are shaping the way the buyout industry is developing in Japan as compared to the United States
and other Western countries.
The emergence of the Japanese buyout industry naturally raises a number of important questions. When
and why, for example, did buyout activity finally get started in Japan? How does the operation of the
buyout industry in Japan compare with that of the United States and other Western countries? What are
the key determinants of the future course of the Japanese buyout industry, and what roles will buyout
firms based in Japan and abroad play in its development?
To explore these and related issues, the Program on Alternative Investments of the Center on Japanese
Economy and Business at Columbia Business School organized a seminar with two leading buyout prac-
titioners, one American and the other Japanese, to share their views with an audience drawn from the
academic and business communities. The first speaker was Mr. Joseph L. Rice III, Chairman of Clayton,
Dubilier & Rice, Inc., a leading New York–based buyout firm, and was followed by Mr. Tsutomu
Yoshida, Senior Vice President of Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), Inc., a large Japanese trading firm that also has
participated in the buyout field. This report presents highlights of the seminar, held on April 7, 2005, at
Columbia University in New York, and moderated by Dr. Mark Mason, Director of the Program on
Alternative Investments.
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Director, Program on Alternative
Investments, Center on Japanese
Economy and Business, Columbia
Business School 
I would like to welcome you to this
final program of the current academic
year, a seminar to compare the devel-
opment of the U.S. and Japanese
buyout industries. The United States
was perhaps the first country in the
world to witness the development of
buyout firms, and we are privileged
to have with us today one of the
founders of the U.S. industry. Only 
in recent years has a buyout industry
emerged in Japan—one with a set 
of characteristics distinctive to that
country—and we are fortunate that
one of the early Japanese practitioners
in his country’s buyout industry also
has joined us this afternoon. I will
ask each of our two speakers to
make initial presentations on their
country’s respective experiences in
the buyout sector, and then open 
up the discussion with the audience. 
It is now my pleasure to introduce
our first speaker, Mr. Joseph Rice,
truly one of the pioneers of the buy-
out industry. Mr. Rice is currently
Chairman of Clayton, Dubilier & Rice,
Inc., a New York–based private equity
firm. As you may know, CD&R has
pursued a control-oriented buyout
strategy that focuses its efforts on
operating improvements in addition
to financial change. After graduating
from Williams College and Harvard
Law School, Joe began a highly suc-
cessful career, first as a corporate
lawyer at the white-shoe Wall Street
law firm Sullivan & Cromwell, and
then as a private equity practitioner. 
I might add that Joe is currently an
Executive-in-Residence at Columbia
Business School. Joe? 
JOSEPH L .  RICE I I I
Chairman
Clayton, Dubilier & Rice, Inc.
Thank you, Mark. I am delighted to
participate in today’s seminar here at
Columbia.
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I graduated from law school in 1960
and came to New York to practice
law with a large firm, but law never
captured my imagination. So when 
I had the opportunity to go into the
buyout business, I jumped at it. The
first transaction I worked on was in
1965, when we bought a business
that had about $10 million in sales.
We paid $3 million for it. Various
financing components were drawn
on, first from a bank that lent the
debt, which was then secured by
inventory and receivables, and sec-
ondly with equity from a group of
individuals, all of whom had been
solicited very carefully. Two weeks
ago, my firm bought a truly global
business with $10 billion in sales. 
We paid $5 billion. It’s headquartered
in France, but does business in
Continental Europe, the United States,
and Asia. There have been a lot of
changes in the business over the last
40 years.
When we started off, I think buyouts
were generally not understood and
were underappreciated. Think about
buyouts, or any truly negotiated
transaction: it’s a very sensible way 
to invest. First, the prospective buyer
gets the benefit of due diligence. Due
diligence represents an opportunity
that you don’t get when buying secu-
rities in the public market. You, your
accountant, and your lawyer get to
go into the company and look under
all the piles of paper to see what’s
there. If anything escapes your atten-
tion, it’s probably your fault rather
than the seller’s. 
In addition, once you’ve bought the
business, you have absolute control.
Unlike owning a public security, 
you can go in, change management,
change the product line, or change
the strategy. That’s a terrific advan-
tage. But as I say, I think all of this
was largely underappreciated in the
late 1960s. 
As we entered the 1970s, a couple of
things happened. First of all, inflation
had a tremendous impact on the
managers of institutional pools of
capital. The rate of inflation, or the
Consumer Price Index (CPI), in 1972
was about 2.2 percent. In 1973 it was
8.8 percent, and in 1974 it was 12.2
percent. Managers of institutional
capital saw the real gains on their
portfolios as a bit paltry, so they
looked around to see if they could
find investment opportunities that
would generate returns that would at
least keep them equal with inflation.
Thus, they turned to venture capital,
buyouts, real estate, oil, and gas.
This, coupled with a few transactions
in the 1970s that generated some
very handsome returns, introduced 
all of the institutional investors to the
potential of the buyout. So when we
entered the 1980s, for the first time
there was an adequate—even overly
adequate—amount of capital avail-
able to fund buyouts.
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During the 1980s and early 1990s, the
American economy went through a
dramatic restructuring. The impact of
shareholder activism and competition
from abroad, mostly from Japan, had
a dramatic impact on the American
manager’s concept of how he ought
to manage his business. Through a
combination of the disposition of
noncore assets, improved manage-
ment of working capital, and
increased productivity, the American
manager dramatically changed his
competitive position in the world. 
As I look back, this activity produced
the golden age for buyouts. There
was a tremendous amount of capital
available. There were lots and lots 
of businesses that were available at
very sensible prices. It really was 
an absolutely fantastic time for our
particular business.
Here’s an example: in 1991, we
bought IBM’s reproduction products
division for $1.6 billion. IBM’s senior
management had decided that they
would divest this business as a part
of a larger strategy to break the par-
ent company into its component
parts. The division consisted of two
product lines: impact printers and
typewriters, and related supplies. 
The division didn’t have many of the
attributes that you would normally
associate with a business. It did not
have a corporate staff, or a sales
force, or an IT system, or an account-
ing system. All of these attributes had
to be built up over the twelve-month
period that was spent negotiating the
transaction. It was in many respects a
company created out of whole cloth. 
The company today is listed on the
New York Stock Exchange. It has a
$10 billion market capitalization, $5
billion in sales, and has truly become
the technology leader in the printer
industry. By any stretch of the imagi-
nation, this was an incredible accom-
plishment, a great business built from
scratch. Best when the business was
initially capitalized, every employee
became either a stockholder or option
holder. When the company went
public, the equity owned by the
employees was worth a billion dollars.
That really is the buyout business 
at its absolute, global best.
As we entered the present decade,
the events of September 11 had a
dramatic impact on almost everyone’s
portfolios. In addition, most investors
had some exposure to technology,
and of course the technology implo-
sion added to our agony. The indus-
try has survived those two cataclysmic
events, and over the last two years
has enjoyed tremendous returns.
When we raised our 1991 fund, 
there were four firms, including ours,
which managed a billion dollars or
more. Today there are a hundred
firms that manage funds of a billion
dollars or more. So the business is
very different from what it was a
short time ago. We are, I think, in 
the midst of a tectonic shift. I can’t
see far enough ahead to tell what 
it’s going to produce, but I know it 
is a change of dramatic proportion. 
Carlyle has raised an $8 billion 
fund. Blackstone seeks $10 billion.
Inevitably this means that there will
be more and more consortia trans-
actions in which financial sponsors
partner together to buy larger business.
Whether or not we will maintain the
returns that have historically charac-
terized this business is a question. 
I would be remiss if I didn’t talk a 
little bit about the globalization of the
business. Starting in the late 1990s,
Europe became everybody’s favorite
place to invest. And in fact, it has
turned out to be quite a fine place to
invest. Europe is going through the
same process that the United States
went through during the 1980s 
and 1990s, which is to say that the
European industrial base is being 
dramatically restructured. 
The next great area of investment
will be Asia. Some firms are out there
already. I think they will lose a lot 
of money before they make any, but
there isn’t any question that Asia is
next on everybody’s list. 
TSUTOMU YOSHIDA
Senior Vice President 
Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), Inc.
Back in 1992, after the bubble economy
burst in Japan, there were quite a
few companies that started to see big
trouble. Since then, I’ve been gaining
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experience by working for turnaround
situations and waiting for the right time
to start a buyout business in Japan. But
how do I get the timing down right?
For the buyout business to start, cer-
tain conditions have to be in place.
First of all, there’s the company to 
be bought, but at the same time 
there also should be fund managers,
investors, and the economic conditions
so a buyout can be accomplished.
Japan’s bubble economy started
around 1986 or 1987 and continued
until April 1991. It functioned similar
to the U.S. economy of the ’60s; a
booming economic period character-
ized by “the bigger, the better,” which
set the stage for the U.S. buyout firms
to emerge in the following decade. 
In the 1970s, the U.S. economy faced
global competition. One obvious 
incident is that the U.S. dollar floated
in 1971 due to a large trade imbal-
ance. Global competition caused U.S.
corporations to streamline their busi-
nesses and the buyout firms arose as
a buyer of noncore businesses from
them. In the 1990s, a very important
event happened in Japan: Yamaichi
Securities, one of the top four security
firms, went bankrupt. People thought
Yamaichi was invincible even though
it was in trouble, because Yamaichi
was once rescued by the Japanese
government back in 1965. But in the
early part of November 1997 when
Moody’s Investor Service downgraded
Yamaichi, it made a bad situation
even worse. Yamaichi was forced to
cease operations within the month.
That was an example of how global-
ization affects the Japanese market.
You couldn’t ignore things like earn-
ings or cash flow anymore in view of
global standards. After that, people
thought about management in a dif-
ferent way. Nobody was going to
help rescue a company. If Yamaichi
was free to collapse, then maybe my
company would be next. That’s when
people started to get more serious
about restructuring their firms and
their subsidiaries and, as a result,
people became a bit more open-
minded to new ideas, including 
proposals from buyout firms. 
In order for a buyout business to
start, you obviously need players. 
I clearly remember that at the end 
of August 1997, the Nikkei newspaper
reported the first Japanese buyout
fund was formed with ¥3 billion.
That’s about $30 million, so it was
quite small. Shortly thereafter, I myself
became one of the three fund man-
agers to start an investment fund of
about $100 million, one of the earliest
buyout funds targeted solely for
Japanese corporations, with two-
thirds of the money coming from
institutional investors and corporate
pension funds. 
From the macroeconomic and social
points of view, together with my
experience on the ground as a fund
manager, I would like to say Japan is
twenty years behind the United States
with regard to the development of a
buyout industry. In order for today’s
audience to feel how different the
market development and conditions
are, I think it would be very interest-
ing to talk about the industry termi-
nology applied in Japan. The same
terminology may be used in both 
the United States and Japan, but the
meaning can be very different due to
the different development stage and
background of buyouts in the two
countries. Here’s a brief explanation
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of what some of the key buyout
words actually mean in Japan.
Private equity fund. While the con-
cept of private equity is quite new
and no exact translation is available
in the Japanese language, there isn’t
a clear-cut understanding or recogni-
tion of the difference between a 
buyout fund and a special situations
fund. Therefore, every current private
equity fund in Japan has a chance to
be considered as a vulture fund. It’s
not a popular term, and people in
Japan still get nervous when they
hear the words “private equity” or
“‘buyout.” 
Fund managers. In the United States,
many fund managers hail from the
industrial sector, but in Japan most
fund managers come from the com-
mercial or investment banking fields.
There are virtually no fund managers
yet in Japan who were previously
business managers outside the finan-
cial services or business consulting
sector. 
Deal flow. In Japan, there is virtually
no deal flow. The deal pipeline is
clogged. Only opportunities exist and
fund managers have to make every
effort to turn opportunities into deals.
It’s still difficult for Japanese compa-
nies to make tough decisions unless
they are at the edge of bankruptcy,
which is why there is virtually no
deal flow. Japanese companies talk 
a lot about restructuring their sub-
sidiaries, fixing their sales, and so
forth, but there’s almost no company
that has followed its words with
actions. Only one exception, as far 
as I know, is Nissan Motors. When
Nissan management was taken over
by France’s Renault, they publicly
declared all of the subsidiaries except
a few would be for sale. That really
was a first for a Japanese company to
start restructuring in a very Westernized
style and really executed it as intended.
Any fund managers were welcomed
at Nissan based upon their ideas and
the merits of their proposals. 
Corporate orphan is a situation that 
is widely seen in Japan. It’s when 
a parent company has so many 
subsidiaries, they’re largely ignored.
Many large Japanese firms have more
than 500 subsidiaries. But sometimes,
although they know they have many
corporate orphans under their wings,
the large corporations are not agile
enough to restructure because they
are preoccupied with fixing their core
businesses. 
Valuation. Don’t be surprised when
the seller’s expectation is ten times
higher than yours. But if you’re
patient, they’ll come back in six
months and it will be half that price.
Then you’ll have a smile on your
face if you want to make the seller
readjust their price expectations fur-
ther. Another way to look at it is to
say that this is a still very inefficient
market for buyout firms to take
advantage of, unless you have
patience as well as a skill set effec-
tive in Japan.
Due diligence. Now this is a very
intriguing part of the business. In
Japan, there’s minimum disclosure. 
I think this is a social and cultural
phenomenon, especially for private
companies. In the United States, 
disclosing every detail makes the
price higher, but it’s a tricky game 
in Japan. This is maybe one of the
reasons why some foreign funds in
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Japan don’t do deals. You have to
wait until people start talking and
trusting you, even though a nondis-
closure agreement is signed. Strong
interpersonal skills are required.
Board control is an intriguing con-
cept. For the majority of Japanese
companies, board meetings are just
empty ceremonies. It is not a surprise
for me that foreign fund managers
are quite at a loss when they see
how board meetings are conducted
in Japan. If no real business decisions
were made in the board meeting,
what can and should fund managers
do? You have to go down the corpo-
rate ladder to grasp the true business
situation to better understand and
take effective control of the company.
This is an issue of corporate gover-
nance and to take majority of the
board is not enough in Japan. This 
is one of the reasons why foreign
fund managers have a tough time 
to execute their strategies in Japan. 
Global opportunities. Many fund 
managers do a very good job at
cleaning up balance sheets and 
cutting expenses, but then what? 
The real question for Japanese fund
managers right now is, “How effec-
tive are you at increasing revenues?”
There isn’t much opportunity left in
Japan to grow since the domestic
market is generally saturated and
competition is keen. When you think
about expanding your market, you
have to go global. Japan doesn’t have
49 other states as U.S. companies
have when looking for expansion.
Also procurement from outside the
country is a key strategic decision to
make, since China is dangerously
closer for Japanese companies than
U.S. companies to ignore. While par-
ticipating in the global marketplace 
is a necessity, it really is a great 
challenge for the buyout fund. 
So to look ahead, the buyout market
is waiting to happen and it’s in the
initial stages. Europe took many years
to develop its buyout market, and so
it will be in Japan. The key factors
for success in Japanese buyouts,
quite different from those in the
United States, boil down to three
major points. The first is to develop a
real deal flow to get started. Second,
to establish a governance system after
you have purchased a firm. And
third, to execute global strategies to
achieve extra returns. In order for the
Japanese buyout business to really
pick up, we only need to have a few
good deals. Although it may take
some years, the possibility is certainly
there, as the economy and corporate
society need this business for their
own future. 
Discussion
Mason: Allow me to take the privi-
lege of the chair by asking the first
few questions. Joe, in your remarks
you said that although you believe
Asia presents the next great geo-
graphic opportunity for the buyout
industry, some of the first or early
movers might run into trouble there.
Could you expand on those com-
ments by sharing with us your views
on Asia as a target of opportunity but
also an opportunity fraught with sig-
nificant risk for the buyout business?
Rice: My experience in putting an
office into Continental Europe, or at
least in the United Kingdom, suggests
to me that it’s infinitely more difficult
to translate or transport American
ideas to Asia than any of us ever
might have suspected. There is a
tremendous language barrier. There 
is distrust of American management
methods. We are inevitably viewed 
as outsiders—and all of that makes
investing very difficult. I think Mr.
Yoshida would underscore the idea
that it’s probably very difficult for 
an American to make a deal in Japan
these days, and I would guess that
Japan is clearly the most fully devel-
oped economy in Asia at this point 
in time.
It’s just experience that makes me say
that. For example, there’s tremendous
charisma about being in China. 
And simply because of that, a lot of
organizations will go to China, make
some investments, and find out they
won’t work out quite right. 
The buyout business works best in
jurisdictions where you have respect
for the rule of law and contracts,
where you don’t have civil unrest,
and where your political affiliation
has absolutely nothing to do with
whether or not the deal is going to
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be successful. Now, I don’t think any
of those apply in China, and there-
fore, I think that it’s a very high-risk
area. 
The above-mentioned things are not
characteristic of Japan, although I will
say that there seems to be a general
distrust there of Americans. There has
been some legislation either proposed
or passed on the basis of the Long-
Term Credit Bank of Japan/Shinsei
Bank transaction that’s designed to
capture some of that money. So to
me, all of that says that you should
tread very carefully. 
Mason: Mr. Yoshida, you worked 
at Clayton, Dubilier & Rice for two
years to learn the buyout business
from the inside. What is the most
important thing you learned during
your time at CD&R?
Yoshida: That’s actually a very diffi-
cult question to answer. Certainly, the
technique of structuring things can be
learned from textbooks, but I learned
how to have a career as a fund man-
ager. If you make an investment, you
have to stick with it for three, five, or
possibly ten years. So the fund man-
ager has to be ready for any kind of
situation to arise in the meantime,
and that’s something you can’t learn
from textbooks. So you have to know
the basic, fundamental techniques
and how to apply them in every situ-
ation, every country, and be ready
for surprises. If there’s any trouble,
you have to be ready to go over to
the company, talk to the CEO. That’s
the most important lesson I learned
during my time at Clayton, Dubilier 
& Rice. 
Question: Mr. Rice, now that the
industry is moving to consortium
deals, will it find itself vulnerable 
to anti-trust litigation for things like
price fixing, bid rigging, and collusion?
Rice: That’s a request for a legal con-
clusion, and although I’m not qualified
to answer that technically, it’s an inter-
esting thought. Any transaction of any
size starts off as an auction. Some of
the price-fixing stigma is taken away
because it’s offered to a variety of dif-
ferent people. I suspect that the partic-
ipants in the auction can legitimately
claim that they have an obligation to
their limited partners to produce a
portfolio that has a variety of different
investments, and to that end, they
limit the amount of any particular
investment in the portfolio.
Question: Mr. Rice, as a non-Asian,
when you talk about Asia, do you
regard Asia as a whole region or do
you divide it into different countries?
I think when you do that, there’s 
a lot of political risk. So when you
make your judgment, do you take
that into consideration?
Rice: Probably not. You’re asking 
me a forthright question so I’ll try to
give you a forthright answer. Asia, as
far as I’m concerned, is somewhere
that’s way out there. I’m showing 
just how parochial I am. I’ve been to
Japan a number of times. I’ve never
been to China. I’ve never been to 
any other parts of Asia. So the general
statements I make about Asia are true
insofar as I reflect the American feel-
ing of inadequacy of visibility to do
business there. 
I do think that language is a tremen-
dous barrier and I think that’s true
virtually anywhere. I’ve gone to
Europe and I know how big a barrier
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it is there, and yet many there speak
English. I know the problem is that
even though senior management
speaks English, the factory workers
don’t, and they’re the ones you want
to go talk to in order to find out
what’s going on. I’m sure the same is
true in Asia, and if not, at least that’s
my perception. I do think that we
will find, at best, ambivalence toward
American management. Europe has 
a very different social contract than
the United States, and I suspect Asia
has a very different one as well. 
So Asians and Europeans legitimately
can say to themselves, “Are these
people who are about to buy our
business going to treat our workers
the way that we are accustomed to?”
Culture, I suspect, is a tremendous
barrier.
Yoshida: I have some comments on
that about Asia. If you try to buy a
business in Asia that’s only a domestic
operation, that’s okay. But if it’s a
manufacturing firm, let’s say in Japan,
you also have to think about the rela-
tionships with China, Korea, Taiwan,
and maybe Thailand, because those
areas are very much related. So fund
managers have to think about the
complex situation and relationships 
of Asia in order to invest there. Asia 
is an integrated area, so you have 
to be careful about the relationships
between the various countries and
cultures.
Question: There are reports that some
hedge fund managers are getting into
the buyout business due to the dimin-
ishing returns in the capital markets.
How will this trend affect your future
investments?
Rice: There’s a lot of chatter about
hedge funds, but I don’t know that
there’s much action. Frankly, I haven’t
seen hedge funds do anything except
participate in transactions that were
managed by conventional buyout
firms that have been around for a
long time.
I believe most hedge funds have a
right of redemption, in that the limited
partner can be redeemed every
month, every quarter, every year, or
every two to five years, but there is a
finite period after which the limited
partner can say, “Give me my money.”
That concept is basically foreign to the
buyout business. We think of investing
in businesses for six, seven, or eight
years. I think that, over time, you may
find that the business is not as attrac-
tive to hedge funds as they may feel 
it is right now.
It may well be that all the chatter
about the buyout business is simply 
a reflection of so much money going
into hedge funds that they no longer
are able to find the spreads that they
once found. Therefore, they’re search-
ing for something else to do, but
whether or not they’re going to find it
in the buyout business I think remains
to be seen. 
Take a look at what Eddie Lampert
has done with K-Mart and Sears.
That’s certainly a different thing and
very akin to, but not the same thing
as, a buyout. He took over K-Mart, as
I understand it, by taking a big posi-
tion in defaulted bonds. I think the
idea of buying public securities, which
you can presumably sell at some
price, is far more characteristic of
hedge funds than doing very involved
transactions with capital structures
when you buy a business in its entirety.
Mason: There are fund managers at
some buyout firms who are now con-
sidering—or have already created—
companion hedge funds under their
existing umbrellas. I think it’s because
they would like to have the flexibility
to invest in deals that they cannot
now invest in through their existing
LP arrangements. Some people argue
that it’s very logical to try to create a
second vehicle with more flexibility,
while others argue it’s a different skill
set. 
Rice: I think it’s a different skill set.
Quite frankly, I think that the buyout
firms that form hedge funds really are
looking for another pool of capital 
to manage. We all charge fees for
managing pools of capital. The more
pools of capital we have, the more
fees we have. In theory, that’s at least
better. I’m not sure that there are any
skills in the buyout business that are
particularly attractive to the hedge
fund business. We’re all analytical,
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but no more analytical than the peo-
ple that you find in hedge funds. 
Question: Compared to the United
States, do you see a difference
between the European and Japanese
capital markets in terms of the urgency
for corporate managers to show earn-
ings? I think the latter two have a longer
timetable. And how would this impact
the potential yield flow for buyouts?
Yoshida: In Japan, there still aren’t 
a lot of shareholders that act in the
proper way in a Western sense. So
companies don’t really get pressured
enough to think about positively
restructuring subsidiaries or whatever.
If there was more pressure, I think
there would be more business for the
buyout industry. So this is something
that will happen in the future in Japan. 
Rice: You can see the impact in
Europe already. There’s a new gener-
ation of managers who think about
their companies very much the same
way that Americans think about their
companies. They’re concerned about
stock prices, and right now, they’re
all concerned about takeovers and
are figuring out ways to stay away
from the American capital market.
But there isn’t any question that
they’re concerned about stock prices.
Question: Mr. Yoshida, I understand
that the Industrial Revitalization
Corporation of Japan (IRCJ) has 
to sell more than 30 companies over
the course of three years. Does this
constitute a buyout opportunity?
Yoshida: The IRCJ is a quasi-govern-
mental body that, in my personal
opinion, is not really a driving force
for the development of the buyout
industry in Japan. If you look at the
list of companies that they’re purchas-
ing, some of them may be famous
names, but they mostly rank number
two or lower in the industry they
belong to. Many of them are very
small. They are not in a main line of
the companies that buyout funds wish
to acquire.
Question: Given the corporate atti-
tude towards divestitures in Japan, 
do you think there would be more
opportunities for a buyout business
to go through public securities like
bonds or stocks—whether it be a
hostile or friendly takeover? Would
that be something that you would
actually consider doing? 
Yoshida: Yes. In the past three
months, there have been so many
articles about hostile and friendly
takeovers due to Live Door’s attempt
to take over Fuji Television. This is 
a great way to educate the public
about takeovers and it’s a huge
opportunity. It’ll be very interesting
to see what happens next. 
Mason: Recently I spoke with some
managers at a couple of the so-called
“activist” firms focused on Japan.
There’s one such firm run by two
Japanese entrepreneurs who raised
about a billion dollars to pursue their
activist approach. This is a strategy
that many predicted would not work
in Japan, yet I was told that their firm
has done more than a dozen deals
and appears to be prospering. I was
also surprised to find that some 52
percent of all the money backing that
particular activist fund came from
established Japanese financial institu-
tions. Do you think Japanese activist
funds will become a significant part
of the buyout picture in Japan in the
years ahead?
Yoshida: I can only say that there’s
finally some social recognition that
these funds exist. It is too early to 
tell how effective such funds will 
be in Japan.
Question: What is your opinion as to
what Japan’s buyout market will look
like five years from now?
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In Japan, there still aren’t a
lot of shareholders that act in
the proper way in a Western
sense. If there was more pres-
sure, I think there would be
more business for the buyout
industry.
—Tsutomu Yoshida
Yoshida: I think the first phase is
now underway. There will be some
winners and losers, but there will be
more opportunities. Thus, we will
gain a much clearer picture of the
buyout industry in Japan around 
year 2010.
Rice: I’m not sure that U.S. buyout
funds will ultimately determine that
Japan is the place to be. I think some
firms might choose China or India
instead. If resources are finite, per-
haps Japan’s market will grow, but 
I suspect that many Americans will
have gone someplace else.
Question: If I recall correctly,
Clayton, Dubilier & Rice has yet to
invest in Asia. Do you plan on doing
so, and what has to change before
you do?
Rice: I think it’s almost inevitable
that this firm will want to go to Asia.
Where they go, however, is unclear
to me. I’ve encouraged them to start
thinking about it now rather than
later since I’m very much affected by
my experience in Europe. It took a
long time to get the European office
up and running the way it ought to
be. We ought to start right now in
Asia. Starting to me means going out
once every quarter and spending a
week and developing relationships
with people. Then, you can hopefully
be in a position to think about put-
ting an office in. In the best of all
possible worlds, you would hire
someone who has an Asian back-
ground who can be taught the busi-
ness the way you believe it. If you’re
on the ground in five years, that
would meet my time schedule.
Mason: Allow me to ask this next
question on behalf of many of the
Columbia Business School students in
the audience this afternoon: What are
some of the key skills or other qualities
one needs in order to have a success-
ful career in the buyout business? 
Rice: You need to be bright and
hardworking, because most of the
organizations are small. It’s a little bit
like being in a firehouse. If there’s
something to do, everybody turns to
it and you do it until it gets done,
even if that means working 24 hours
a day, seven days a week. You have
to be prepared to do that because
the opportunities are relatively few
and far between, and if you have
one, you really don’t want to let it go.
On the other hand, you have periods
of downtime, too. You have to be
able to adjust to this very odd rhythm
that exists in the business. Sometimes
you’ll come to the office and there
will be nothing to do. You still go out
and turn over rocks and make phone
calls, but sometimes no matter what
you do, nothing works. 
Don’t ever underestimate personality.
We are all out there selling all the
time and that, in many aspects, is
what distinguishes the successful
from the unsuccessful. Our job is to
convince you that whatever it is that
you want to do, you would rather do
it with us than the competition. Thus
the ability to relate to people, to be 
a person who people trust first, is 
a tremendous thing in our business.
There’s a time in every transaction
where there’s a shift in the balance 
of power. As long as the seller has 
an auction, he’s got all the power
because he’s going to pick one of all
of you out there. The minute he has
picked you and announced it, the
leverage is all on your side because
he is truly exposed. He’s told people
about the sale, so more than anything
else, he needs to see the transaction
go through as advertised. Being able
to convince people that you are trust-
worthy, that you mean what you say,
that you will deliver on the promises
that you have made, and that you
will not try and renegotiate terms
later is a tremendous asset to have.
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I’m not sure that U.S. buyout
funds will ultimately deter-
mine that Japan is the place
to be. I think some firms 
might choose China or India
instead.
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